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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Burton v. Stewart,1 the Supreme Court narrowly avoided 
deciding whether Blakely v. Washington2 is a “new” rule, as well as the 
related question of whether Blakely should be applied retroactively 
on collateral review. Instead, the Court ruled that Mr. Burton’s 
petition for review did not meet the “gatekeeping requirements of 28 
U.S.C. § 2244(b).”3 By deciding Burton on procedural grounds rather 
than considering the merits of the underlying claims upon which 
certiorari was granted, the Court delayed consideration of important 
issues, which are likely to resurface. 
In this commentary, I begin by describing Mr. Burton’s claim that 
the Court’s Blakely decision should be available to prisoners 
challenging their prison sentences through habeas corpus review.4 
Next, I review the historical underpinnings of the Court’s Teague v. 
Lane5 decision, which established the modern framework for 
determining when the Court’s decisions will be retroactively 
applicable.6 I then explore how the Court has applied one part of the 
Teague test, the critical determination of when a decision is “new.”7 
Finally, I attempt to apply this part of the Teague test to the Blakely v. 
Washington decision.8 As this attempt reveals the uncertainty 
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 1. 127 S. Ct. 793 *2007). 
 2. 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
 3. 127 S. Ct. 793, 794 (2007). 
 4. See infra Part I. 
 5. 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
 6. See infra Part II. 
 7. See infra Part III. 
 8. See infra Part IV. 
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surrounding the application of the Teague test, I conclude with a brief 
discussion of the implications of the continued use of this method for 
determining when a Supreme Court decision is “new,” and propose 
that the Court should rethink, or at least carefully apply this test.9 
II.  THE PLEA FOR RETROACTIVITY IN BURTON V. 
STEWART 
In the June 2000 decision of Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Supreme 
Court described the constitutionally guaranteed right that “[o]ther 
than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty 
for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be 
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”10 The 
Apprendi decision impacted Lonnie Burton,11 a prisoner in the State 
of Washington, whose sentence had depended on his sentencing 
judge’s independent findings.12 After he had exhausted his direct 
appeals, and his conviction had become final,13 Mr. Burton filed a 
Personal Restraint Petition in the Supreme Court of Washington as 
well as a writ of habeas corpus in federal court on the grounds that his 
conviction was unconstitutional.14 In both “collateral attacks,” he 
relied on Apprendi, arguing that the sentencing judge had 
impermissibly relied on facts neither proven to a jury, nor proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt.15 However, both the state and federal 
courts denied Mr. Burton’s request for relief, the Supreme Court of 
Washington explicitly stating that “Apprendi does not apply to 
exceptional sentences that are otherwise within the statutory 
maximum for the crime.”16 
 
 9. See infra Conclusion. 
 10. 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). 
 11. Mr. Burton was convicted of rape, robbery, and burglary in a Washington state court. 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Burton v. Waddington, No. 05-9222, 2006 WL 1525997, at *3 
(Feb. 10, 2006). His sentence for these crimes was consecutively imposed after the court found 
exceptional circumstances under Washington’s Revised Code § 9.94A.400 (2007). Id. 
 12. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Burton v. Waddington, No. 05-9222, 2006 WL 1525997, 
at *3 (Feb. 10, 2006); see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 37, Burton v. Stewart, 127 S. Ct. 
793 (2007), (Justice Stevens noting that “[i]t nowhere says they’re unnecessary either” to the 
judge’s sentence). 
 13. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Burton v. Waddington, No. 05-9222, 2006 WL 1525997, 
at *3 (Feb. 10, 2006). 
 14. Id. at *4. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at *5 (quoting Supreme Court of Washington, Ruling Denying Review, No. 72656-4 
(July 16, 2002)). 
 2007] BURTON V. STEWART 41 
 
Following the completion of Mr. Burton’s case, the Supreme 
Court decided Blakely v. Washington. In Blakely, the Court agreed 
with Mr. Burton’s argument, and disagreed with the lower courts’ 
characterization of Apprendi, holding that “the relevant ‘statutory 
maximum’ is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after 
finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any 
additional findings.”17 This ruling meant that judges in future cases 
could no longer independently find facts as the judge did in Lonnie 
Burton’s case.18 However, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the Supreme 
Court’s clarification of the law would not benefit Mr. Burton, as his 
conviction had become final prior to the Supreme Court’s Blakely 
decision.19 In Burton v. Waddington, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to address whether the Blakely decision applied to criminal 
defendants whose conviction had already become “final” before it 
was decided.20 Though the Court remanded Burton based on the 
district court’s lack of jurisdiction to consider the habeas petition, the 
issues contained in the case are likely to be raised again and remain 
important for practitioners. 
The Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in Burton represented the 
latest in a long line of cases in which the Court has considered 
whether one of its decisions should be available to prisoners 
collaterally attacking their convictions through a writ of habeas 
corpus. Traditional jurisprudence in this area relies heavily on an 
analysis by Justice Harlan for the purpose of the “great writ,” and his 
proposal that a “new rule” should generally not be available to such 
prisoners.21 
III.  THE RETROACTIVITY RULE:  
THE ROAD TO TEAGUE V. LANE 
The modern framework for assessing whether Supreme Court 
decisions should be retroactively applied was developed in a series of 
cases following the Court’s 1965 proclamation that the Constitution 
 
 17. 542 U.S. 296, 303–04 (2004). 
 18. See, e.g., State v. Washington, 143 P.3d 606 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) (holding a Blakely 
violation under facts substantially similar to those in Mr. Burton’s case). 
 19. Burton v. Waddington, 142 F. App’x. 297 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 20. Burton v, Stewart, 127 S. Ct. 793 (2007). 
 21. See infra Part II. 
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does not require retroactive application of criminal decisions.22 This 
framework was born in Justice Harlan’s dissent in Desist v. United 
States,23 subsequently germinated in his concurring opinion in Mackey 
v. United States,24 and culminated in the Court’s decision in Teague v. 
Lane after Justice Harlan was no longer on the Court.25 To replace the 
balancing test in place at that time,26 Justice Harlan created a 
framework in which he relied heavily on the difference between 
direct review of, and collateral attack on, a conviction. 
For cases on direct review, Justice Harlan noted that “[m]atters of 
basic principle are at stake” when deciding to which defendants to 
apply the Court’s decisions.27 Lamenting a system in which the Court 
would “simply pick and choose from among similarly situated 
defendants those who alone will receive the benefit,”28 he concluded 
that the Court has “no right on direct review to treat one case 
differently from another with respect to constitutional provisions 
applicable to both.”29 He rested this conclusion on his view of the role 
of the Court: “I continue to believe that a proper perception of our 
duties as a court of law, charged with applying the Constitution to 
resolve every legal dispute within our jurisdiction on direct review, 
mandates that we apply the law as it is at the time, not as it once 
was.”30 Thus, to achieve fairness, Justice Harlan believed that a 
Supreme Court decision that interprets the criminal law should be 
applied to every criminal defendant whose case is still pending, until 
all appeals have been exhausted. 
Justice Harlan viewed the application of Supreme Court decisions 
to prisoners who already had exhausted their direct appeals very 
differently. The common-sense notion that everyone should benefit 
from a changed interpretation of the law, which Justice Harlan 
applied for direct review, was here counterbalanced by an 
understanding that “the law” is not an absolute truth that judges 
“find,” but is more simply just a question of what was “on the books” 
 
 22. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). 
 23. 394 U.S. 244, 256 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 24. 401 U.S. 667, 675 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 25. 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
 26. E.g., Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 636. 
 27. Desist, 394 U.S. at 258. 
 28. Id. at 259. 
 29. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 701 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 30. Id. at 681. 
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when a crime was committed.31 Because the courts’ role is “to say 
what the law is,”32 equal application of the law to everyone would only 
require an equal application of the law as it was then understood. 
Thus, Justice Harlan’s description of the role of the Court suggests 
that there is nothing inherently aberrant in applying different rules to 
people who were convicted when different Supreme Court decisions 
were in effect. For him, the issue of whether a decision should be 
applied to cases on collateral review hinges on what makes the 
collateral review system different from the system of direct appeal. 
Noting the “expansion of the writ” in the prior years, Justice 
Harlan asserted that “[t]he primary justification given by the Court 
for extending the scope of habeas to all alleged constitutional errors is 
that it provides a quasi-appellate review function, forcing trial and 
appellate courts in both the federal and state system to toe the 
constitutional mark.”33 In other words, the purpose of collateral 
review is to serve as a procedural safeguard designed to ensure that 
courts at all levels are applying the law, including relevant Supreme 
Court decisions, as it was then fairly understood. As Justice Harlan 
described, “the threat of habeas serves as a necessary additional 
incentive for trial and appellate courts throughout the land to conduct 
their proceedings in a manner consistent with established 
constitutional standards.”34 Most important, he noted, “[i]n order to 
perform this deterrence function, . . . the habeas court need only apply 
the constitutional standards that prevailed at the time the original 
proceedings took place.”35 This purpose is reflected in the statutory 
requirement that habeas review be granted only if the lower court 
uses an “unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, 
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”36 
Importantly, Justice Harlan did not envision habeas review as 
primarily a process for obtaining justice for an individual defendant. 
 
 31. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (“But law in the sense in which 
courts speak of it today does not exist without some definite authority behind it. . . . The 
authority and only authority is the State, and if that be so, the voice adopted by the State as its 
own (whether it be of its Legislature or of its Supreme Court) should utter the last word.”) 
(quoting Black and White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab & Transfer 
Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533–35 (1928))). 
 32. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 33. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 687. 
 34. Desist, 394 U.S. at 258–59. 
 35. Teague v. Lyons, 489 U.S. 288, 306 (1989) (quoting Desist, 394 U.S. at 263). 
 36. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (1996). 
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As the Court has reminded, this system is not intended to be a 
substitute for direct review, and, is not “defined . . . by reference to a 
perceived need to assure that an individual accused of crime is 
afforded a trial free of constitutional error.”37 As Justice Harlan 
observed, “it is not a principal purpose of the writ to inquire whether 
a criminal convict did in fact commit the deed alleged.”38 
This understanding of the purpose of habeas explains why Justice 
Harlan felt that “new” Supreme Court decisions should generally not 
be applied retroactively to habeas petitioners. Asking lower courts to 
correctly predict the outcome of Supreme Court decisions does 
nothing to advance habeas’ purpose of keeping lower courts 
accountable. An understanding of this purpose of habeas also explains 
why all decisions that are not deemed to be new should be available 
to someone collaterally attacking their confinement through habeas 
review. If the Supreme Court sees its decision as dictated by 
precedent, a lower court’s failure to come to the same conclusion is, 
by definition, “unreasonable application of clearly established Federal 
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”39 
Deciding to apply “established” rules retroactivity is just as important 
to serving the purpose of habeas as the decision not to apply “new” 
rules retroactively, by requiring the lower courts to faithfully apply 
the Court’s explicit decisions as well as to apply the logic implicit in 
the decision to any new situation. Retroactive application of any 
decision that clearly and logically follows from a previous one is the 
role of a “reasonable jurist,” one who does not look for ways to 
distinguish a case from the Court’s decisions, but rather faithfully 
follows both the decision and its intent. By 1982, the Court viewed 
this principle as obvious: 
[W]hen a decision of this Court merely has applied settled 
precedents to new and different factual situations, no real question 
has arisen as to whether the later decision has arisen as to whether 
the later decision should apply retrospectively. In such cases, it has 
been a foregone conclusion that the rule of the later case applies in 
earlier cases, because the later decision has not in fact altered that 
rule in any material way.40 
 
 37. Kuhlman v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 447 (1986) (plurality opinion). 
 38. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 694. 
 39. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (1996). 
 40. United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 549 (1982). 
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Justice Harlan’s analysis also relied on the state’s interest in the 
finality of its judgments, and what this means to the scope of habeas 
review. He regarded this interest as “substantial,” asserting that it is “a 
matter of fundamental import that there be a visible end to the 
litigable aspect of the criminal process,”41 and found agreement in 
Congress’s having changed the habeas statute “to introduce a greater 
measure of finality into the law.”42 He was particularly suspicious of 
whether habeas was a proper use of “the very limited resources 
society has allocated to the criminal process,”43 when collateral review 
is utilized “to relitigate facts buried in the remote past.”44 
Despite these concerns about retroactivity, Justice Harlan made 
clear that fairness to an individual, and the demands of justice, 
nevertheless, required application of some “new” decisions even to 
collateral review. In particular, he defined those situations to include 
when the rule involves “substantive due process,” placing “private 
individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making 
authority to proscribe,”45 or when the decision requires adherence to 
“procedures that . . . are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”46 
These latter situations have often been described as the “‘watershed 
rules of criminal procedure’ implicating the fundamental fairness and 
accuracy of the criminal proceeding.”47 
In 1987, in Griffith v. Kentucky,48 the Court adopted the first part 
of Justice Harlan’s opinion, deciding that a “new” rule would be 
applied to all cases pending on direct review. Two years later, in 
Teague v. Lane, the Court adopted Justice Harlan’s framework in its 
entirety.49 To conduct a Teague analysis, therefore, the Court needs to 
first determine whether or not a rule is “new.” If it is not “new,” but 
rather directly follows from a prior decision, it is retroactively 
applicable. If it is “new,” it will not be retroactively applied, unless it 
falls into one of the exceptions described by Justice Harlan. Whether 
Blakely is a “new” rule and, if so, whether it should nonetheless be 
 
 41. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 690. 
 42. Id. at 688. 
 43. Id. at 691. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 692. 
 46. Id. at 693 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 47. Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990). 
 48. 479 U.S. 314 (1987). 
 49. 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
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retroactively applied was the issue before the Court in Burton v. 
Stewart.50 
IV.  THE COURT’S APPLICATION OF THE TEST FOR “NEW” 
As Justice Harlan noted in Mackey v. United States, there are: 
[I]nevitable difficulties that will arise in attempting to determine 
whether a particular decision has really announced a ‘new’ rule at 
all or whether it has simply applied a well-established 
constitutional principle to govern a case which is closely analogous 
to those which have been previously considered in the prior case 
law.51 
When adopting Harlan’s framework for determining the 
retroactivity of the Court’s decisions, the Teague v. Lane Court agreed 
with this proposition, acknowledging “[i]t is admittedly often difficult 
to determine when a case announces a new rule.”52 Experience with 
the Teague rule has not simplified this inquiry. 
In Desist v. United States, Justice Harlan first described a decision 
that his proposed framework would not characterize as “new.”53 This 
case involved a situation in which the Court had “never previously 
encountered the precise situation raised,” but wherein the “decision in 
that case rested upon . . . established doctrine.”54 He characterized 
these non-“new” decisions as follows: 
[M]any, though not all, of this Court’s constitutional decisions are 
grounded upon fundamental principles whose content does not 
change dramatically from year to year, but whose meanings are 
altered slowly and subtly as generation succeeds generation. In 
such a context it appears very difficult to argue against application 
of the “new” rule in all habeas cases since one could never say with 
any assurance that this Court would have ruled differently at the 
time the petitioner’s conviction became final.55 
 
 50. 127 S. Ct. 793 (2007). 
 51. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 695 (1971) (internal quotations and citation 
omitted) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 52. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989). 
 53. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 263 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (describing the 
decision in Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), as resting upon Johnson v. United 
States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948), and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964)). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 263–64. 
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The Court applied this principle in Yates v. Aiken,56 holding that 
the prior decision in Francis v. Franklin57 had been “merely an 
application of the principle that governed . . . in Sandstrom v. 
Montana,”58 and thus “did not announce a new rule.”59 In Teague, the 
Court added specificity to the analysis of what constitutes a “new” 
rule by stating that “[i]n general . . . a case announces a new rule when 
it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the 
Federal Government.”60 In addition, “a case announces a new rule if 
the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the 
defendant’s conviction became final.”61 With respect to the rule being 
considered in Teague itself, the Court relied heavily on its having 
overruled a previous case in order to conclude that it was a new rule.62 
In the decades following Teague, the Court has applied this test 
for what constitutes a new rule while continuing to reflect upon the 
test’s origin in the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus. Yet, through 
these decisions, the “new rule” test has undergone a palpable change 
in emphasis, with the result that fewer decisions can be characterized 
as not being “new.” In Butler v. McKellar, the Court reiterated that 
“[a] new decision that explicitly overrules an earlier holding obviously 
‘breaks new ground’ or ‘imposes a new obligation,’”63 but cautioned 
that the “inquiry will be more difficult”64 in most cases. The Butler 
Court viewed the Teague test as one that “validates reasonable, good-
faith interpretations of existing precedents,”65 a description that 
indicates the Court would be reluctant to characterize a decision as 
not being “new.”66 Further highlighting this perspective, the Court 
asserts that “the fact that a court says its decision is . . . ‘controlled’ by 
a prior decision, is not conclusive for purposes of deciding whether 
the current decision is a ‘new rule’ under Teague.”67 Thus, the Court 
relied on “a significant difference of opinion on the part of several 
 
 56. 484 U.S. 211 (1988). 
 57. 471 U.S. 307 (1985). 
 58. 484 U.S. 211, 217 (1988). 
 59. Id. at 218. 
 60. 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 295 (“Batson constituted ‘an explicit and substantial break with prior precedent 
because it overruled a portion of Swain.’”) (citations omitted). 
 63. 494 U.S. 407, 412 (1990). 
 64. Id. at 413. 
 65. Id. at 414. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 415. 
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lower courts”68 and its view that its decision was “susceptible to 
debate among reasonable minds”69 to conclude that its decision in 
Arizona v. Roberson70 was “new.”71 
On the same day the Court decided Butler, it also described, the 
“new rule” test as a determination of whether a lower court “would 
have felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the rule . . . 
was required by the Constitution.”72 Four dissenters in these two cases 
described the majority as having “limited drastically the scope of 
habeas corpus relief through the application of a virtually all-
encompassing definition of ‘new rule.’”73 Nonetheless, the majority of 
the Court maintained that if “reasonable jurists may disagree,” a rule 
is new.74 
A year later, in a situation closely analogous to that presented in 
Burton, the Court considered whether two cases75 were applications of 
a previously announced principle76 or represented new rules.77 
Importantly, in finding that the cases did not break new ground and 
did not announce new rules, the Court attempted to limit the broader 
definition of “new rule,” noting that “reasonableness . . . is an 
objective standard”78 and that a circuit court’s contrary view is “not 
dispositive.”79 
However, subsequent cases have confirmed the broad reading of 
“new.” A few years later, in Lambrix v. Singletary, the Court 
considered “significant” to its conclusion that a decision had 
announced a “new rule” the fact that that decision “itself did not 
purport to rely upon any controlling precedent.”80 This case contains, 
perhaps, the broadest language yet regarding the definition of “new 
rule,” stating that Teague “asks whether [a case] was dictated by 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. 486 U.S 675 (1988). 
 71. Butler, 494 U.S. at 415. 
 72. Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 (1990). 
 73. Id. at 497 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 74. Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 234 (1990). 
 75. Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988); Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 
(1990). 
 76. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). 
 77. Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222 (1992). 
 78. Id. at 237. 
 79. Id. 
 80. 520 U.S. 518, 528 (1997). 
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precedent—i.e., whether no other interpretation was reasonable.”81 
When applying the “reasonableness” test for whether a decision is 
“new,” the Court has paid particular attention to both the existence 
and the substance of dissents from that decision.82 In O’Dell v. 
Netherland, the Court relied on the existence of dissenters, noting 
“[t]he array of views expressed in [the case] itself suggests that the 
rule announced there was, in light of this Court’s precedent, 
‘susceptible to debate among reasonable minds.’”83 
More recently, in 2004, the Court again emphasized the 
significance of the dissenting opinion.84 Noting that the dissenters 
argued that the Court’s precedents “did not control” that decision, the 
Court concluded that “[i]t follows a fortiori that reasonable jurists 
could have concluded that the [earlier cases] did not compel [the 
latter].”85 Thus, the modern rule for determining whether a holding is 
new is for the Court to “ask whether the decision in question was 
dictated by precedent,” and, if “reasonable jurists” could disagree 
about the correct application of the Court’s holding, a rule will be 
considered new for Teague purposes.86 
The “reasonableness” rule for determining whether a decision is 
“new” accords with the language of the statute controlling availability 
of the writ of habeas review. If there are multiple ways that 
reasonable jurists can interpret a holding, none can be described as 
“contrary to, or involv[ing] an unreasonable application of, clearly 
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the 
United States,” the standard for habeas review.87 Furthermore, 
correcting a state’s reasonable but mistaken interpretation of 
Supreme Court precedent does nothing to advance the purpose of the 
writ to encourage states to faithfully apply the law as it was then 
understood. 
Thus, the modern inquiry into if a rule is “new” hinges on whether 
the Court believes that a decision is the only “reasonable application” 
 
 81. Id. at 538. 
 82. Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406 (2004). 
 83. O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 159–60 (1997) (quoting Butler v. McKellar, 494 
U.S. 407, 415 (1990)). 
 84. Beard, 542 U.S. at 415. 
 85. Id. at 416. The Court also disclaimed in a footnote that “we do not suggest that the 
mere existence of a dissent suffices to show that the rule is new.” Id. at 416 n.5. 
 86. Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 308 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 87. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006). 
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of its precedent. The Court’s precedent indicates that it will variously 
consider 1) whether the decision itself overrules an earlier holding or 
purports to rely on precedent, 2) the extent of disagreement among 
lower courts about whether Blakely is “new”, and 3) the existence and 
substance of dissents to the opinion. 
V.  IS BLAKELY V. WASHINGTON A “NEW” RULE? 
The challenge accepted by the Supreme Court in granting 
certiorari in Burton v. Stewart was to apply the Teague v. Lane test to 
its decision in Blakely v. Washington. After determining the 
preliminary procedural issue of when Mr. Burton’s conviction became 
final, the first substantive component of this application is 
determining whether Blakely is a “new” rule or “dictated by 
precedent.” Because I conclude that Blakely is likely not a “new” rule, 
I need not explore whether Blakely might meet either of the two 
exceptions that would grant the decision retroactive status even if it 
were a “new” rule. To assess whether the Court is likely to conclude 
that Blakely is a “new” rule in the future, I will look to each of the 
factors the Court has previously relied on: (1) whether the decision 
itself overrules an earlier holding or purports to rely on precedent, (2) 
the extent of disagreement among lower courts about whether 
Blakely is “new,” and (3) the existence and substance of dissents to 
the opinion. 
A. Does Blakely overrule an earlier holding or purport to rely on 
precedent? 
Clearly, the Court’s decision in Blakely v. Washington did not 
overrule an earlier holding and thus is not easily categorized as a 
“new” rule.88 In contrast, as Mr. Burton argued during oral argument, 
the “jury verdict beyond a reasonable doubt” standard in Blakely was 
expressed in Supreme Court precedent from as long ago as 1970 in In 
re Winship.89 In that case, the Supreme Court stated that “[l]est there 
remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-
doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause 
protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a 
 
 88. See Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415 (1990) (explaining when courts will consider 
whether a rule is “new”). 
 89. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
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reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with 
which he is charged.”90 In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Court explained 
that its decision relied on Winship and its progeny.91 During oral 
argument, Burton’s counsel reminded the Court of “several passages 
in Apprendi that said that the statutory maximum was the maximum 
allowed based on the facts in the jury verdict,” and that these 
statements were sufficient to dictate the aspect of Blakely’s holding 
that would result in a favorable outcome for defendants like Mr. 
Burton.92 Although Blakely also defined “statutory maximum” in a 
manner later applied to the federal guidelines in United States v. 
Booker,93 that application of Apprendi would not have been necessary 
for Mr. Burton, and is not necessary for similarly situated defendants. 
For Mr. Burton, all that would have been necessary is that the judge’s 
discretion be “based on the facts in the jury verdict.”94 
A point in favor of the position that Blakely is not a “new rule” 
but rather is an application of established law is the fact that the 
Blakely majority announced that its decision merely required 
application of “the rule . . . expressed in Apprendi” and believed that 
“precedents make clear” its ultimate holding.95 In Booker, the Court 
continued to suggest that the Blakely decision was pre-ordained by 
Apprendi, reiterating “[o]ur precedents, we explained, make clear that 
the ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum 
sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflects in 
the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.”96 Whereas these 
statements are “not conclusive,”97 they demonstrate that, unlike 
Lambrix v. Singletary,98 Blakely does purport to rely on precedent. 
Therefore, this first factor suggests that Blakely is not a “new” rule 
and should thus apply retroactively under the Teague test. 
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B. Do lower courts disagree about whether Blakely is “new”? 
On the other hand, the opinions of various lower courts suggest 
that Blakely might involve the creation of a “new” rule. A number of 
federal circuit courts of appeal and state supreme courts had been 
faced with Blakely-like situations after Apprendi v. New Jersey but 
before Blakely v. Washington was decided, and concluded that 
Apprendi did not extend to those situations.99 Similarly, after the 
Blakely decision, a number of circuit courts of appeals considered 
whether the decision was “new” under the Teague v. Lane test and 
concluded that it was.100 Still, although the fact that lower courts did 
not agree with the Court’s ultimate holding in Blakely is illustrative, it 
is also “not dispositive.”101 Moreover, more interesting than the fact 
that five courts of appeals decided that Blakely was a “new” rule for 
Teague purposes is the reasoning behind these courts’ conclusions. 
The first circuit court to consider Blakely’s retroactivity was the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Price.102 The Price 
court relied on the fact that Blakely defined “statutory maximum” 
and thus crafted a new rule to conclude that Blakely, as a whole, 
should not apply retroactively.103 However, as explained above, the 
definition of “statutory maximum” is irrelevant to how Blakely 
applies to Mr. Burton, or similarly situated defendants, who challenge 
their confinement based upon the existence of judge-found facts. 
Subsequently, the First, Eleventh, and Eighth Circuits each also 
held that Blakely does not apply retroactively, but did so only after 
concluding that the Supreme Court’s later decision in United States v. 
Booker also does not apply on collateral review.104 As one of these 
courts described, “Blakely claims are now viewed through the lens of 
United States v. Booker . . . .”105 Unfortunately, this merging of the 
Blakely and Booker decisions precludes any consideration of the 
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application of Blakely to cases such as Mr. Burton’s, which do not 
necessarily rely upon the Court’s application of Apprendi in Booker. 
Whether the Court’s decision in Booker is “new” is a separate 
question that must be addressed independently. As these circuit 
courts did not address the issue of the retroactivity of Blakely directly, 
their conclusions can have only limited force in the Court’s 
determination of whether Blakely is “new.” 
Finally, in Schardt v. Payne, the Ninth Circuit relied entirely on 
those aforementioned cases in which lower courts had failed to 
extend Apprendi to Blakely-like situations before the Supreme Court 
decided Blakely itself.106 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that because the 
lower courts had not reached the same conclusion regarding the 
application of Apprendi that the Supreme Court eventually did, “the 
rule announced in Blakely was clearly not apparent to all reasonable 
jurists.”107 However, the logic of this position is weakened in particular 
circumstances, such as those raised by Justice Souter during oral 
argument in Burton.108 As he noted, the force of implication that can 
be drawn from the existence of disagreements amongst the lower 
courts is diminished when those courts are simply engaging in an 
“exercise of hope” by “expressing the hope that the Court would 
draw a distinction which it had not drawn,” rather than concluding 
that “Apprendi requires a certain result.”109 After all, the purpose of 
habeas is precisely to prevent this kind of independent wishful 
thinking on the part of lower courts, and to “forc[e] trial and appellate 
courts in both the federal and state system to toe the constitutional 
mark.”110 To this end, allowing habeas review of lower courts’ 
decisions, which were decided between Apprendi and Blakely, serves 
the very purpose Justice Harlan attributed to the Great Writ. 
C. The existence and substance of dissents from the Blakely opinion 
As noted above, the Court has recently focused on an opinion’s 
dissenters when deciding whether a rule is “new” for Teague 
purposes.111 In Blakely v. Washington, there were three separate 
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dissents from the Court’s decision, which were authored by Justice 
O’Connor, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Breyer.112 As the Court made 
clear in Beard v. Banks, the impact of these dissents on the Court’s 
decision depends on the substance of their disagreement.113 In this 
case, the impact of the dissents is potentially very limited by their lack 
of disagreement with the majority regarding the substance of the 
holding itself. In one remarkable moment during oral argument, 
Justice Breyer, one of only two dissenters in Blakely who are still on 
the Court (along with Justice Kennedy), acknowledged that when 
writing his dissent he “couldn’t think of how they might have limited 
Apprendi” so as to preclude Blakely’s outcome.114 This strongly 
suggests that Blakely is not a “new rule.” Furthermore, during oral 
argument in Burton v. Stewart, Justice Souter concluded his 
questioning by asking the state whether reading Apprendi like Justice 
O’Connor proposed in her Blakely dissent would have been a clear 
application of Apprendi or something new. The state responded that it 
“definitely would have been something new.”115 If the state is correct 
that Justice O’Connor’s dissent was predicated on “a distinction which 
simply was not addressed in Apprendi,”116 this suggests that, like 
Justice Breyer’s dissent, her dissenting opinion also does not stand for 
the proposition that Blakely is a “new” rule. Thus, the only one of the 
three opinions that nudges in that direction is the dissenting opinion 
of Justice Kennedy, which does not attack the Blakely decision on the 
grounds that it does not obviously follow from Apprendi but rather 
challenges Blakely based on a policy concern that the decision does 
not comport with separation of powers ideals. 
Taken together, the factors the Court looks to when deciding if 
one of its decisions is “new” lean toward the conclusion that Blakely 
does not establish a “new” rule but rather applies the Court’s 
Apprendi decision, as the Court purports to do.117 However, this 
conclusion is subject to disagreement on each of the factors 
considered, and the Court’s recent proclivity for deeming their 
decisions “new” might suggest the opposite outcome. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
It is important that the Supreme Court decide that Blakely v. 
Washington is not a “new” decision when and if the Court grants 
certiorari in a case similar to Burton. To fully understand the 
application of Teague v. Lane,118 it is necessary to recall the context 
within which this doctrine first arose. In developing his framework, 
Justice Harlan explicitly noted that the move was necessary only 
“given the current broad scope of constitutional issues cognizable on 
habeas.”119 In the face of opposition like that of the dissenters to 
Teague, who viewed the general rule against retroactivity as an 
“unprecedented curtailment of the reach of the Great Writ,”120 Justice 
Harlan specifically explained that the Court needed to limit the 
availability of the writ in order to ensure the finality of state court 
judgments.121 Perhaps most important is his explanation in Mackey v. 
United States that “[a]s regards cases coming here on collateral review, 
the problem of retroactivity is in truth none other than one of 
resettling the limits of the reach of the Great Writ, which under the 
recent doctrines of this Court has been given almost boundless 
sweep.”122 
In contrast to the expansive availability of habeas review to which 
Justice Harlan and his contemporaries were responding,123 the Court 
today decides questions of retroactivity against a backdrop of recent 
legislative and judicially created restrictions on the availability of 
habeas review. Among these changes are the provisions of the Anti-
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”),124 
which involves a “new statute of limitations, increased deference to 
state court findings, strict limitations on successive habeas petitions, 
and special procedures for capital habeas petitioners.”125 Moreover, 
these legislative changes reflect only part of the panoply of recent 
changes to habeas’ availability. Describing the judicially created 
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limitations which were created prior to AEDPA, one commentator 
recognized, 
The Court adopted and rigorously enforced strict rules of 
procedural default, excluded Fourth Amendment claims from 
habeas corpus review, made it more difficult for a habeas 
petitioner to obtain an evidentiary hearing to prove a 
constitutional violation, adopted an extremely restrictive doctrine 
regarding the retroactivity of constitutional decisions, reduced the 
burden on the states to establish harmless error once a 
constitutional violation was found, and erected barriers to the 
filing of a second habeas petition.126 
In light of these changes to the availability of habeas, especially 
the statute of limitations, the Great Writ appears to be less of an 
independent attack on confinement and more closely approximates 
one particular method for reaching “final judgment.” With these 
legislative changes to the scope of habeas corpus review, the practical 
effect is that state decisions have greater finality sooner after they are 
made, fewer prisoners are likely able to collaterally attack their 
confinement, and fewer of the prisoners who do so will benefit from 
Supreme Court decisions. In light of these effects and in the context 
of the comparatively limited availability of the writ today, Justice 
Harlan’s rationale for limiting the retroactivity of “new” decisions 
may not be well founded.127 
One important consideration in this regard is that AEDPA 
adequately maintains a state’s “interest in finality”128 by including a 
one-year statute of limitations within which prisoners may challenge 
their confinement.129 The states’ interest in finality is thus already 
preserved without the Teague rule. The additional limitations similarly 
have the effect of reducing challenges to lower courts’ judgments. This 
effect is demonstrated by Mr. Burton’s own case, as the Supreme 
Court ultimately determined that he was not able to have his case 
 
 126. Stephen B. Bright, Is Fairness Irrelevant?: The Evisceration of Federal Habeas Corpus 
Review and Limits on the Ability of State Courts to Protect Fundamental Rights, 54 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1, 9 (1997) (internal citations omitted). 
 127. See generally Deborah L. Stahlkopf, A Dark Day for Habeas Corpus: Successive 
Petitions Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 
1115 (1998). 
 128. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 683 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 129. McCollough, supra note 125, at 376. 
 2007] BURTON V. STEWART 57 
 
decided because he failed to meet limitations on the availability of 
habeas review.130 Furthermore, as state courts know that federal courts 
have only a limited ability and time period within which to review 
their judgments, it is likely that the purpose of habeas to ensure that 
the states “toe the line” has already been severely hampered. Thus, 
each of Justice Harlan’s rationales behind the creation of the Teague 
framework is no longer controlling. Just as the Court has previously 
limited Teague to the “circumstances which gave rise to it,”131 it may 
make sense in today’s context to allow retroactivity even of “new” 
rules, and to reconsider the Teague rule. 
Still another perspective the Court may consider regarding Teague 
is the effect that regularly deciding their decisions are “new” has on 
general perspectives of the Court. When Justice Harlan originally 
described his proposal for determining retroactivity, including the test 
of when a decision should be described as “new,” he noted that “many, 
though not all, of th[e] Court’s constitutional decisions are grounded 
upon fundamental principles whose content does not change.”132 
Although the Supreme Court may conclude, in some later case, that 
Blakely is not “new” under Teague, application of the Teague test 
above illustrates that this outcome is by no means certain. This 
uncertainty reveals just how far the test for what constitutes a “new” 
rule has drifted from Justice Harlan’s original proposal, and just how 
difficult it has become for a court to conclude that a decision is not 
“new.” 
In a very real sense, Blakely is the prototypical non-”new” case, 
which is “grounded upon fundamental principles whose content does 
not change.” If this case, resting on “a fundamental reservation of 
power in our constitutional structure”133 can be described as “new,” 
the Court can surely describe any decision as “new.” This fact calls 
into question the Court’s very method of decision-making. The 
Court’s reluctance to hold that its decisions were “dictated by 
precedent” is that the Court appears to be less bound by precedent 
and “to depend on nothing more than the proclivities of the 
individuals who now comprise a majority of th[e] Court.”134 In 
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contrast, by deciding that Blakely and similar constitutionally-based 
decisions are not “new,” the Court upholds the ideal of that body as 
independent of its members. As Justice Scalia recently noted, “[w]hat 
distinguishes the rule of law from the dictatorship of a shifting 
Supreme Court majority is the absolutely indispensable requirement 
that judicial opinions be grounded in consistently applied principle.”135 
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